In a recent assessment, it was found that a specific Group Poilcy granted via "User Right Assignments" the SeRelabelPrivilege to the built-in Users group and was applied on several computer accounts. I never found this privilege before and was obviously curious to understand the potential implications and the possibility of any (mis)usage scenario. Microsoft documentation…

TL;DR (really?): Members of Distributed COM Users or Performance Log Users Groups can trigger from remote and relay the authentication of users connected on the target server, including Domain Controllers. #SilverPotato Remember my previous article? My insatiable curiosity led me to explore the default DCOM permissions on Domain Controllers during a quiet evening... Using some…

In my exploration of all the components and configurations related to the Windows Active Directory Certification Services (ADCS), after the "deep dive" in Cert Publishers group, I decided to take a look at the "Certificate Service DCOM Access" group. This group is a built-in local security group and is populated by the special NT AUTHORITY\Authenticaterd…

Sometimes I think that starting with a hypothetical scenario can be better than immediately diving into the details of a vulnerability. This approach, in my opinion, provides crucial context for a clearer understanding, especially when the vulnerability is easy to understand but the scenario where it could apply is not. This post is about possible…

While writing my latest post, my attention was also drawn to the Cert Publishers group, which is associated with the Certificate service (ADCS) in an Active Directory Domain. I was wondering about the purpose of this group and what type of permissions were assigned to its members. I was also curious to understand if it…

Microsoft addressed our LocalPotato vulnerability in the SMB scenario with CVE-2023-21746 during the January 2023 Patch Tuesday. However, the HTTP scenario remains unpatched, as per Microsoft's decision, and it is still effective on updated systems. This is clearly an edge case, but it is important to be aware of it and avoid situations that could…

In a recent assessment, I found that a user without special privileges had the ability to make changes to the NTAuthCertificates object. This misconfiguration piqued my curiosity, as I wanted to understand how this could potentially be exploited or misused. Having write access to the NTAuthCertificates object in Windows Active Directory, which is located in…

Summary A standard domain user can exploit Arbitrary File Write/Overwrite with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM under certain circumstances if Group Policy “File Preference” is configured. I reported this finding to ZDI and Microsoft fixed this in CVE-2022-37955 Versions Affected Tests (April 06, 2022) were conducted on the following Active Directory setup: Domain computer: Windows 10/Windows 11 &…

Here we are again with our (me and @splinter_code) new *potato flavor, the LocalPotato! This was a cool finding so we decided to create a dedicated website 😉 The journey to discovering the LocalPotato began with a hint from our friend Elad Shamir, who suggested examining the "Reserved" field in NTLM Challenge messages for potential…

Well, it's been a long time ago since our beloved JuicyPotato has been published. Meantime things changed and got fixed (backported also to Win10 1803/Server2016) leading to the glorious end of this tool which permitted to elevate to SYSTEM user by abusing impersonation privileges on Windows systems. With Juicy2 it was somehow possible to circumvent…